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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
time" after six months' notice. Five years later plaintiffs attempted
to exercise their option, but defendants refused to repurchase the stock.
Held, for the defendant. Haworth v. Hubbard, - Ind. - 44 N.E. 967
(1942).
The words of a contract should be given their' common ordinary
meaning unless it is repugnant to the intent of the parties. New York
Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corporation, 34 F. (2d) 655, 656
(C.C.A. 2nd, 1929). Generally, courts hold against the theory that a con-
tract confers a perpetuity of right or imposes a perpetuity of obligations.
Holt v. St. Louis Union Tr. Co., 52 F. (2d) 1068 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931);
Hess v. Iowa Heat & Powers Co., 207 Iowa 820, 221 N. W. 194 (1928).
In a contract for the return- of shirts, Iye v. Brody, 156 Ill. App.
479 (1910); a friendly offer to purchase stock, Park v. Whitney, 148
Mass. 278, 19 N. E. 161 (1889); a right to remove property, Perry
v. Acme Oil Company, 44 Ind. App. 207, 88 N. E. 859 (1909); a lease
for cutting timber, Fletcher v. Lyon, 93 Ark. 5, 123 S.W. 801 (1909);
a right to certain oil casings and rods, Terry v. Crosswy, Tex. Civ. App.,
264 S.W. 718 (1924); insurance contracts for reporting losses, Pickels
v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 119 Ind. 291, 21 N.E. 898 (1889); oral agreement
to repurchase stock, Armstrong v. Orler, 220 Mass. 112, 107 N.E. 392
(1915); the courts have held the words "at any time" to mean "any
reasonable time."
In the principal case the defendant was in a private enterprise
subject to all the dangers of competition; the business was constantly
threatened with radical changes in management; the plaintiffs were
located in the same community as the corporation and able to watch
its trends closely. It seems improbable that the parties had in mind
entering into an unending obligation. "Any other theory than this
would subject incautious persons-a class, it may be remarked, which
includes the majority of mankind-into life long servitudes, and greatly
fetter and embarrass the commerce of the world." Dover Copper Mining
Company v. Doenzes, 40 Ariz. 349, 12 P. (2d) 288, 292 (1932).
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
JURISDICTION OF STATE EQUITY COURTS
Complainant was discharged for alleged violation of a labor con-
tract between defendant company and defendant union. He seeks re-
instatement and an injunction against the enforcement of the contract
in a state court of equity. Held, action dismissed. A state court of
equity has no jurisdiction over disputes cognizable under the National
Labor Relations Act. Keller v. American Cyanide Co., -N.J. Eq.-,
28 Atl. 41, (1942).
The procedure prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act,
49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§151-166 (1941) is exclusive. Na-
tional Labor Relations Board v. Link Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584 (1940);
National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350
(1940); National Labor Relations Board v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453
(1939). These decisions are based on §10(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §160 (1941) which declares that the power
of the Board "shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any
[Vol. 18
NOTES AND COMMENTS
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise." The legislative
intent to give the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction
is apparent.
In Manning v. Feidelson, 175 Tenn. 576, 136 S.W. (2d) 510 (1940),
a state court of equity was petitioned for initial relief before exhaust-
ing the remedies of National Labor Relations Board. The Court ar-
rived at a decision similar to the principal case by analogy to cases
involving jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379-387 (1887), 49 U.S.C. §11-18
(1941), especially §9. State courts are excluded from jurisdiction in
these cases. 11 Am. Jur. 130.
A recent case involving jurisdiction of another administrative
board, the Railway Labor Board, reveals a tendency to give complain-
ant, in like circumstances, an election of either administrative or
judicial relief. Moore v. Illinois Central Ry. Co., 312 U.S. 630 (1941);
see Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F.(2d) 235 (App. D.C.
1941); Notes (1942) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 641, (1942) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 859,
(1942), 51 Yale L. J. 666. However, the jurisdictional section of Rail-
way Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) as amended, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934),
45 U.S.C. §153(1) (1941), stipulated that disputes "shall be referred to
the Adjustment Board." In 1934, the mandatory "shall" was amended
to the permissive "may." The court's interpretation of the legislative
intent was based on this amendment.
TRADE REGULATION
THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N CASE
The American Medical Association and the Medical Society of the
District of Columbia and certain practicing physicians and officers of
these associations were indicted for conspiring to violate Sec. 3 of the
Sherman Act' by hindering and obstructing the operations of Group
Health Association, a nonprofit corporation organized by Government
employees to provide medical care and hospitalization on a risk sharing
prepayment basis. 2 Held, the associations were guilty of a conspiracy
to restrain trade in the Dist. of Col. Amer. Med. Assn. v. United States,
63 Sup. Ct. 326 (1943).3
1. 15 U.S.C. 3.
2. The district court sustained the defendant's demurrer and held
that neither the practice of medicine nor the Group Health Associ-
ation activities was trade within the meaning of the Sherman
Act. 28 F. Supp. 752 (1939). The court of appeals reversed,
holding that either could be trade. 110 F. (2d) 703 (1940). The
district court then convicted the associations but acquitted the
individual defendants which was affirmed by the court of ap-
peals. 130 F. (2d) 233 (1942).
3. This case has caused much comment. The Chicago Tribune, April
7, 1941, thought that since the American Medical Association had
been held to be a trade that they should have gotten their charter
from William Green or John L. Lewis. The Baltimore Sun, April
6, 1941, thought it quite anomalous that carpenters are not in a
trade but physicians are. See also, Washington (D.C.) Post, April
6, 1941; New York Times, April 7, 1941; Time, January 25, 1943,
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